Churchill’s Crusade:  The British Invasion of Russia 1918-1920  
Clifford Kinvig (London: Hambledon Continuum, 2006), 400 pages

Reviewed by:  Wm. Matthew Kennedy, University of Texas at Austin
      
This book finds itself among very few other works that deal with the British contribution to the White Army
during the formative years of the Soviet Union.  Further distinguishing itself,
Churchill’s Crusade
investigates the military intervention in Russia during and after the First World War as a function of
Churchill’s own persona.  The title appears deceptive, for the work itself centers on the interactions of the
British Generals commanding the three fronts of the conflict, and their exchanges with both the overbearing
Churchill government and the incoherent White Russian government.
      
Kinvig provides a very illuminating and particular study into the lives of the British commanders and how
they conducted their operations.  In so doing, he reveals the deplorable state of both the British and White
Russian armies after the 1914-1918 war.  In several discussions regarding the myopia of the War Office,
and the Churchill government as a whole, Kinvig communicates the extent to which ministers scraped the
British Army’s barrel to deploy forces to Russia, and thus how these decisions doomed the intervention from
the outset.  The author also makes quite clear the complete lack of unity between the several contingents
of anti-Bolshevik Russian governments and forces.  He ultimately argues that the attempted integration of
disorganized and inadequately motivated Russian troops around the core of poor-quality multinational
forces dealt a mortal blow to the entire campaign.  Therefore, without any clear aim or objective except for
an abstracted concept of victory, the lack of coherence fatally incapacitated the anti-Bolshivek movement,
and resulted in the defeat of the White forces.
      
While his argument transmits itself clearly through the several anecdotes, letters, and war diaries, readers
may find Kinvig’s organization hard to follow at times.  Those unfamiliar with the 1919-1921 Russian Civil
War will occasionally find themselves lost in chronology or in geography, resulting from sudden jumps from
the Siberian front to the Karelian front.  Nevertheless,
Churchill’s Crusade ultimately succeeds in lending far
more than sufficient evidence to prove that the stubborn prosecution of an unwinnable war resulted in
defeat.  Although it cannot stand as the foundational piece for the Allied intervention in Russia during 1918-
1921, Kinvig’s book provides an invaluable look into the problems behind the military fiascos and those who
perpetuated them.
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